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Abstract
As an effective resource allocation approach, double auctions (DAs) have been extensively studied in electronic commerce. Most
previous studies have focused on how to design strategy-proof DA mechanisms, while not much research effort has been done
concerning privacy and security issues. However, security, especially privacy issues have become such a public concern that
the European governments lay down the law to enforce the privacy guarantees recently. In this paper, to address the privacy
issue in electronic auctions, we concentrate on how to design a privacy-preserving mechanism for double auctions by employing
Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption and sorting networks. We achieve provable privacy such that the auctions do not
reveal any bid information except the auction results, resulting in a strict privacy guarantee. Moreover, to achieve practical system
performance, we compare different sorting algorithms, and suggest using the faster ones. Experimental results show that different
sorting algorithms may have great effect on the performance of our mechanism, and demonstrate the practicality of our protocol
for real-world applications in electronic commerce.
Keywords: Privacy-preserving, Double auction, Homomorphic encryption, Sorting networks
1. Introduction
With the rapid development of electronic commerce over the Internet, a large number of auction services exist
on the Internet during the past a few years. Double auctions are adopted by many of current electronic exchanges
for matching buyers and sellers (Shi et al., 2016). Other auctions are also widely employed as efficient mechanisms
to allocate goods, resource, etc., to promote the ideality of competitive pricing and to maximize the commodity
value. The rapidity and convenience of the Internet has accelerated online auctions to individuals, businesses and
governments around the world, admittedly, and the range of items sold by auctions also has been greatly extended by
e-commerce, where millions of transactions can be accomplished in the blink of an eye. For example, eBay-the most
popular and well-known auction site on the Internet announced that its total commodity trading in 2017 was US$88.4
billion, with net revenues of US$9.567 billion, an increase of 7% over the 2016 (http://www.ebay.com).
At present, there are four basic types of auctions: the English (also called the oral, open, or ascending-bid) auc-
tion, the Dutch (or descending-bid) auction, the sealed-bid auction, and the double auction (DA) (McAfee, 1992). In
different application scenarios, each type of auction has its advantages and disadvantages. Numerous auction mech-
anisms have been proposed in order to satisfy various economic properties such as truthfulness, profit maximization,
and social efficiency (cf. Iosifidis et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016; Cai et al., 2014 and references therein). Unfortunately,
living in the era of information, it is extremely difficult to guarantee complete security and privacy. According to
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annual reports of the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C), online auctions constitute the main access point
for criminals to acquire identity information and strip consumers of money or merchandise (NW3C 2014). Once a
large amount of bid information is leaked, it will bring irreparable losses to the buyers or the sellers. For instance, in
2014 the famous online auction giant eBay was hacked, and quantities of auction data were stolen, which brought a
net loss of US$18 million to the company in the first quarter of that year.
There are two major research directions in regard to auctions. One is the research into auction protocols. An
auction protocol defines the valid behaviors of participants in order to ensure the efficiency and privacy. The other
research direction is on bidding strategies in terms of cost saving, perceived bidder enjoyment and bidder satisfaction.
Our paper lays more emphasis on the former.
1.1. The problem of bid privacy disclosure
It is well acknowledged that information privacy has become an issue of universal concern recently. Auctions
are not immune to privacy disclosure and this commitment to a correct process can be greatly difficult to achieve.
There are many reasons for the cause of this phenomenon, such as the auctioneer breaks the rules of the auction in
favor of some bidders, or the collusion between the auctioneer and a part of bidders to share a large extra profit, or
criminals steal bid information for money. More than ethically troubling, privacy disclosure is undesirable because it
can bring about an efficiency loss, a money loss, unfair distribution and malignant competition. Privacy disclosure is
a widespread, real-world and noteworthy problem, as illustrated by the following examples:
• The Attorney General of New York, Eliot Spitzer, accused major insurance brokers in the U.S. These insurance
brokers manipulated bids in order to assign contracts to bidders in exchange for bribes which were up to $845m
just in the year 2003 (Lengwiler and Wolfstetter, 2005).
• In May 2016, a Russian hacker stole 272.3 million e-mail messages, including 40 million Yahoo mails, 33
million Microsoft mails and 24 million Google mails. Later, this information flowed into the black market in
Russia and sold for less than US$1.
• In 2017, Bithumb, South Korea’s first virtual currency trading platform, was hacked and about 30,000 personal
user data were stolen. After the information was leaked, the hacker used personal user data to steal the money
in the account and telephoned the exchange staff to make phone fraud.
When bid is the only factor in determining the winner of an auction, then an increasing number of participants
tend to adopt a privacy-preserving, sealed-bid auction to prevent bid privacy disclosure.
McAfee’s double auction is most widely used because of its economic robustness such as truthfulness, individual
rationality and ex-post budget balance (Chen et al., 2014). However, most studies on it have focused on how to design
strategy-proof DA mechanisms (Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016; Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2015; Samimi et al., 2016;
Shi et al., 2016; Ma and Leung, 2007), while little research effort has been done concerning privacy and security issues
in the auctions, leading to bid privacy disclosure largely. This would in turn lead to a series of severe consequences.
• For the sellers, it can easily adjust its bid according to the buyers’ and other sellers’ bids to obtain extra profit.
• For the buyers, similarly, it can easily adjust its bid according to the sellers’ and other buyers’ bids to lower its
cost.
• For the auctioneer, since it can obtain bid information directly from both sellers and buyers, it may tamper with
the auction result, and hence destroy the truthfulness of the whole auction.
1.2. Our solution
Recently, some mechanisms for privacy-preserving auctions have been proposed (Huang et al., 2013; Nojoumian
and Stinson, 2014). These works dealt with only single-sided auctions. For double auctions, there are multiple
potential buyers and potential sellers simultaneously permitted to bid to exchange designated goods, and a more
complex logic is needed to match between buying and selling requirements. Indeed, there have also been some
double auction mechanisms with privacy protection, such as Li et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2015). However, they
are mainly focused on the application setting of double spectrum auctions, and use quite different security techniques
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such as garbled circuits and secret sharing. In contrast, this paper will employ Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic
encryption to provide an alternative privacy-preserving mechanism based on McAfee’s double auction mechanism,
and experimentally validate that different sorting algorithms may have great influence on the performance of the
proposed mechanism.
Architecturally, our auction framework is depicted in Fig. 1: each buyer (or seller) submits his bid to the auc-
tioneer. But both buyers and sellers do not reveal their respective bid information during the auction. Instead, they
submit encrypted bids to the auctioneer who determines the winners and assignments in company with the agent,
which plays a role in administering the private key for the privacy-preserving auction. As long as the auctioneer and
the agent do not collude to manipulate the auction, our mechanism can achieve provable privacy. Our contributions
can be summarized as follows.
(1) As far as we know, we are the first to design a privacy-preserving double auction with Goldwasser-Micali
homomorphic encryption, and implement the mechanism with different sorting algorithms.
(2) We theoretically prove the privacy of our double auction mechanism, with the privacy formulation from secure
two party computations.
(3) We experimentally evaluate and compare the performance of our mechanism using different sorting algo-
rithms.
Sellers
Buyers
Auction Agent
Auction Result
Figure 1. Privacy-preserving double auction architecture
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some technical preliminaries. We present
our mechanism in detail, and theoretically prove its privacy in Section 3. In section 4, we implement our mechanism
and evaluate its running performance with different sorting algorithms. Section 5 reviews related work and discusses
the difference about those studies briefly. Finally, we make a conclusion in Section 6.
2. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some technical preliminaries for understanding our mechanism subsequently.
2.1. McAfee’s Double Auction
We assume that there are M sellers and N buyers in the auction, and all auction goods are homogeneous which
means that each individual good is identical and that all goods have little or no differentiation in terms of features,
benefits, or quality. Each seller si bids V si to sell a good, and each buyer bi bids V
b
i to buy a good. The auction
proceeds as follows:
(1) Bid sorting: Sort buyers’ bids in non-increasing order and sellers’ bids in non-descending order:
Vb1 ≥ Vb2 ≥ · · · ≥ VbN
V s1 ≤ V s2 ≤ · · · ≤ V sM
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(2) Winner determination: Find the index of the last profitable transaction k shown in Equation (1) by means of
comparing Vbi and V
s
i with i starting from 1. Then the first (k − 1) sellers and the first (k − 1) buyers are the
auction winners.
k = argmax{V si ≤ Vbi } (1)
(3) Pricing: Pay each winning seller equally by V sk , and charge each winning buyer equally by V
b
k .
2.2. Homomorphic Encryption
In our design of a privacy-preserving auction mechanism, a semantically secure cryptosystem is needed. Ho-
momorphic encryption is a special type of encryption technique that allows computations to be done on encrypted
data. In our paper, we choose the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (K, E,D) (Blum and Goldwasser, 1985), where
K, E and D denote the key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm, respectively. These
algorithms of Goldwasser-Micali scheme definition can be described as follows.
• Key generation: the algorithm takes a security parameter as input and then generates two distinct large prime
numbers p and q, computes n = pq and finds a non-residue x. The public key kp is (x, n), and the private key ks
is (p, q).
• Encryption algorithm: a message m ∈ {0, 1}l is encrypted as the ciphertext c which makes use of the public key:
c = y2xm(mod n)
Where y is randomly chosen from Z∗n.
• Decryption algorithm: a ciphertext c is decrypted as the message m using the prime factorization (p, q), where
m = 0 if c is a quadratic residue, m = 1 otherwise.
This cryptosystem possesses the XOR homomorphism, that is, for any m,m′ ∈ {0, 1} the following equation holds.
D(E(m, kp) × E(m′, kp), ks) = m ⊕ m′ (2)
In particular, a ciphertext c = E(m, kp) can be randomized into other forms without changing its corresponding
plaintext, as follows.
c′ = E(m, kp) × E(0, kp) (3)
2.3. Cryptographical Privacy
In our auction context, the standard definition of cryptographical privacy against semi-honest adversaries in two-
party computations can be described as follows (Chen et al., 2016).
Definition 1 (Privacy against semi-honest attackers). Let f (x, y) be a functionality with two inputs x and y, and
two outputs f A(x, y) and f B(x, y). Suppose that protocol II computes functionality f (x, y) between two parties Alice
and Bob. Let V IIA (x, y) (resp. V
II
B (x, y)) represent Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) view during an execution of II on (x, y). In
other words, if (x, rIIA ) (resp. (y, r
II
B )) denotes Alice’s (Bob’s) input and randomness, then
V IIA (x, y) = (x, r
II
A ,m1,m2, · · · ,mt)
V IIB (x, y) = (y, r
II
B ,m1,m2, · · · ,mt)
Where {mi} denote the messages passed between the parties.
LetOIIA (resp. O
II
B ) denote Alice’s (Bob’s) output after an execution of II on (x, y), andO
II(x, y) = (OIIA (x, y),O
II
B (x, y)).
Then we say that protocol II preserves privacy (or is secure) against semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) simulators S 1 and S 2 such that
{(S 1(x, fA(x, y)), f (x, y))} ≡ {(V IIA (x, y),OII(x, y))} (4)
{(S 2(y, fB(x, y)), f (x, y))} ≡ {(V IIB (x, y),OII(x, y))} (5)
Where ≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
In the sense of cryptography, to protect both sellers’ and buyers’ bids (privacy), the secure protocol should reveal
nothing about these bids except what is revealed from the auction outcome.
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3. OUR MECHANISM
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving auction mechanism, whose auction framework is illustrated in
Fig. 1. As shown in the figure, the auctioneer receives the (encrypted) bids from all buyers and sellers and then
performs the privacy-preserving auction, while the agent is in charge of assisting the auctioneer in the process of
auction. Adopting the above framework, we design a privacy-preserving auction mechanism. Note that in the paper,
we assume that the auctioneer and the agent do not collude with each other. This assumption is essentially neces-
sary to achieve cryptographical privacy, since if the auctioneer and the agent collude with each other, namely, both
computation parties are corrupted, then all bid information will be certainly leaked to the adversary.
Definition 2 (Encrypted Bit Vector). The Encrypted Bit Vector (EBV) representation of value v is a vector EL(V) of
ciphertexts like
EL(V) = (cL, cL−1, · · · , c1) = (E(αL), E(αL−1), · · · , E(α1))
Where E(.) is Goldwasser-Micali’s encryption function, L is the bit length, (αL, αL−1, , α1) denotes the binary
representation of V , with αL the most significant bit, and α1 the least significant bit.
3.1. Privacy-preserving Auction Framework
In order to guarantee that neither the auctioneer nor the agent can obtain anything about bid information except
the final auction outcome during the auction, we design our privacy-preserving double auction mechanism using
homomorphic encryption and sorting networks in Protocol 1. In our paper, we assume that there is an authenticated
and secure communication channel between buyers (or sellers) and the auctioneer, and between the auctioneer and the
agent. The design rationale can be described as follows.
(1) Setup
The agent generates its secret-public key pair of Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption, and then publishes
its public key to all the participants of the auction, including the auctioneer, the sellers and the buyers.
(2) Bidding
Each buyer or seller encrypts its bid-ID pair in the form of EBV using the public key of the agent, and submits
its EBV pair to the auctioneer. Note that, in order to determine privately who the winners are, we need to encrypt
the buyers’ or sellers’ IDs in the EBV form together with their bids. Otherwise, the bid ranking information of both
sellers and buyers would simply leak in the next step.
(3) Private sorting
The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately sort the buyers’ EBV bid-ID pairs in non-ascending order of
bids, and the sellers’ EBV bid-ID pairs in non-descending order of bids, making use of the XOR homomorphism of
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. How to privately perform the sorting procedure is detailed in Section 3.4. In
this process, the auctioneer knows nothing about the buyers’ or sellers’ bids; similarly, the agent only plays a role in
providing some necessary calculation results to the auctioneer and also knows nothing about the bids. In the end, the
auctioneer holds the private sorting for both the sellers’ and the buyers’ bid-ID pairs.
(4) Private winner determination
The main goal of this step is to obtain the encrypted auction outcome under the collaborative work of the auctioneer
and the agent. A natural procedure for winner determination proceeds as follows. In order to determine the index of
the last profitable transaction, the auctioneer compares the sorted seller’s EBV bids and buyer’s EBV bids one by one,
which should start from the minimum EBV bid in the seller set and the maximum EBV bid in the buyer set. And then
the encrypted comparison results are sent to the agent, who decrypts these encrypted data using the private key, and
sends the index of the last profitable transaction k back to the auctioneer. Getting k, the auctioneer can easily obtain
the EBV auction outcome.
(5) Outcome release
A naive idea to release the auction outcome is as follows. The auctioneer sends the EBV IDs of the winners,
namely the first (k−1) sellers and the first (k−1) buyers, and the EBV clearing prices EL(V sk ) and EL(Vbk ) to the agent.
The agent decrypts all these received EBV data, and sends back the plain final auction outcome including the IDs of
winners and the clearing prices to the auctioneer.
The idea above seems to work well: the auctioneer and the agent cooperate to determine the winners and no exact
bids are leaked to them. However, there is indeed some information about the bids leaking. It is noteworthy that each
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buyer’s or seller’s ID and bid are combined together as a whole, to put it another way, each ID is uniquely mapped to a
bid. So, if the encrypted IDs of winners are decrypted just in the current orders of sellers and buyers, which are sorted
in term of bids, the bid ranking information of both seller and buyer winners would be certainly leaked. The leaked
information is obviously more than what we can infer from the auction outcome. Thus, in the sense of cryptography,
the above procedure is not really secure.
Protocol 1 Privacy-preserving Double Auction
Output: Double Auction results in the clear
Step1: Setup
The agent generates its secret-public key pair (sk, pk) of homomorphic encryption, and then publishes its
public key pk to the auctioneer, the buyers and the sellers.
Step2: Bidding
(1) Each seller sends its encrypted bid-ID pair (ELpk(V
s
i ), E
L′
pk(si)) to the auctioneer.
(2) Each buyer sends its encrypted bid-ID pair (ELpk(V
b
i ), E
L′
pk(bi)) to the auctioneer.
Step3: Private sorting
The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately sort sellers’ encrypted bid-ID pairs in non-descending
order, and buyers’ encrypted bid-ID pairs in non-ascending order, both in term of bids:
(ELpk(V
s
1), E
L′
pk(s1)), (E
L
pk(V
s
2), E
L′
pk(s2)), · · · , (ELpk(V sM), EL
′
pk(sM))
s.t. ELpk(V
s
1) ≤ ELpk(V s2) ≤ · · · ≤ ELpk(V sM)
(ELpk(V
b
1 ), E
L′
pk(b1)), (E
L
pk(V
b
2 ), E
L′
pk(b2)), · · · , (ELpk(VbN), EL
′
pk(bN))
s.t. ELpk(V
b
1 ) ≥ ELpk(Vb2 ) ≥ · · · ≥ ELpk(VbN)
Note that, for convenience, here we abuse the same indexes after sorting.
Step4: Private winner determination
The auctioneer and the agent cooperate to privately compare ELpk(V
s
i ) with E
L
pk(V
b
i ), until the index of the last
profitable transaction k is found.
k = argmax{ELpk(V sk ) ≤ ELpk(Vbk )}
The auctioneer gets the encrypted auction outcome including the encrypted IDs of the seller and buyer winners,
and the encrypted clearing prices, as follows.
Encrypted winner IDs:
EL
′
pk(s1), E
L′
pk(s2), · · · , EL
′
pk(sk−1) (6)
EL
′
pk(b1), E
L′
pk(b2), · · · , EL
′
pk(bk−1) (7)
Encrypted clearing prices: ELpk(V
s
k ) and E
L
pk(V
b
k ).
Step5: Outcome release
The auctioneer randomly permutes the two arrays (6) and (7), respectively, and then sends the resulted arrays
to the agent.
The agent decrypts the encrypted auction outcome:
DLsk(E
L
pk(V
s
k )) = V
s
k ,D
L′
sk(E
L′
pk(si)) = si(i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1)
DLsk(E
L
pk(V
b
k )) = V
b
k ,D
L′
sk(E
L′
pk(bi)) = bi(i = 1, 2, ..., k − 1)
The agent then sorts the two arrays of si’s and bi’s in ascending order, and returns all decrypted auction
outcome to the auctioneer.
Finally, the auctioneer charges the expenses from each winning buyer and pays the earnings to each winning
seller.
In order to make this natural procedure of winner determination secure, something has to be done before the
decryption of the auction outcome, so that neither the auctioneer nor the agent can match the ID of any winner to
its bid ranking position. Specifically, we let the auctioneer randomly permute the encrypted IDs of both seller and
buyer winners before sending to the agent for decryption, and let the agent also randomly permute the decrypted IDs
of both seller and buyer winners before returning back to the auctioneer (In protocol 1, instead of applying a random
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permutation, we sort IDs in ascending order, assuming that the bids are independent on IDs.). Finally, when the
auction is over, the auctioneer announces final winner list and charges the expenses from each winning buyer, and
pays the earnings to each winning seller.
The global algorithm is illustrated in Protocol 1.
3.2. Private Gate Computation
In term of computation theory, any computable function can be represented by a Boolean circuit with only XOR
and AND gates. Thus, to compute an auction privately, we need to compute both XOR and AND gates privately.
With the XOR homomorphism of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem, we can let the auctioneer directly compute
the XOR gate over the ciphertexts without knowing the private key and the input bits. Then the question is if we can
also compute the AND gate privately with the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem. The answer is yes. Our main idea is
to introduce some appropriate interactions between the auctioneer and the agent, in addition to the application of the
XOR homomorphism. We now describe how to compute an AND gate privately.
Let a, b ∈ {0, 1} denote the two input bits to the AND gate, respectively. Suppose that the auctioneer holds the
encrypted bits E(a) and E(b), and wants to compute E(a ∧ b) (∧ represents AND gate) without knowing anything
about the secret key and the input bits a and b with some interactions with the agent. The computation proceeds as
follows.
Firstly, the auctioneer selects two random bits r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1} and then calculates E(r1) and E(r2) using the public
key.
Then, the auctioneer can obtain the following equations according to Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic property:
E(r1) × E(a) = E(r1 ⊕ a)
E(r2) × E(b) = E(r2 ⊕ b)
Since a = r1 ⊕ r1 ⊕ a and b = r2 ⊕ r2 ⊕ b, we can decompose the bit a into the XOR of two bits a1 = r1 and
a2 = r1 ⊕ a. Similarly, the bit b can be computed by b = b1 ⊕ b2 with b1 = r2, b2 = r2 ⊕ b. Therefore we have
E(a ∧ b) = E((a1 ⊕ a2) ∧ (b1 ⊕ b2))
= E(a1 ∧ b1 ⊕ a1 ∧ b2 ⊕ a2 ∧ b1 ⊕ a2 ∧ b2)
= E(a1 ∧ b1) × E(a1 ∧ b2) × E(a2 ∧ b1) × E(a2 ∧ b2) (8)
Distinctly, due to the auctioneer knows the value of a1, b1, E(a) and E(b), so it can compute E(a2), E(b2), E(a1∧b1)
and E(a1 ∧ b2):
- E(a2) = E(a1) × E(a)
- E(b2) = E(a2) × E(b)
- When a1 = 0, E(a1 ∧ b2) = E(0)
- When a1 = 1, E(a1 ∧ b2) = E(b2)
Similarly, the value of E(a2 ∧ b1) can easily get. Nevertheless, the auctioneer cannot calculate by itself the value
of E(a2 ∧ b2).
Next, the auctioneer should send the value of E(a2) and E(b2) to the agent who manages the private key. After
that the agent decrypts them to obtain the value of a2 and b2, and then passes the calculation result of E(a2 ∧ b2) back
to the auctioneer.
Finally, the auctioneer can compute the value of E(a ∧ b) absolutely according to the Equation (8).
Using the above analysis and prove, it can draw a conclusion that information leakage will be avoided as long as
the auctioneer and the agent cannot collude to seek personal interests. The private AND computation is depicted in
Protocol 2, where AR and AT are the abbreviation of the auctioneer and the agent respectively.
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Protocol 2 Product of Two Bits
Input: AR holds E(a) and E(b)
Output: AR obtain E(a ∧ b)
1: Step AR
2: a1, b1 ∈ {0, 1}; //Select randomly
3: E(a2)← E(a1) × E(a);
4: E(b2)← E(b1) × E(b);
5: if a1 = 0 then
6: E(a1 ∧ b2)← E(0)
7: else
8: E(a1 ∧ b2)← E(b2)
9: end if
10: if b1 = 0 then
11: E(a2 ∧ b1)← E(0)
12: else
13: E(a2 ∧ b1)← E(a2)
14: end if
15: Sends E(a2) and E(b2) to AT;
16: Step AT
17: a2 ← D(E(a2)), b2 ← D(E(b2));
18: Sends E(a2 ∧ b2) to AR;
19: Step AR
20: E(a ∧ b)← E(a1 ∧ b1) × E(a1 ∧ b2) × E(a2 ∧ b1) × E(a2 ∧ b2)
3.3. Private Integer Comparison
As we can see clearly from Protocol 1, one of the most important steps is private integer comparison. Based on
the private gate computation described in Section 3.2, in order to design a private protocol for integer comparison, we
need only to design a Boolean circuit comprised of only XOR and AND gates, then for each gate apply either XOR
or AND private gate computation step, and finally all these steps are composed as a whole protocol. Specifically,
we could take cognizance of the difference between the XOR and AND private gate computations. The former only
requires computation using Equation (2) without any communication, which needs a small price; however, the cost
of the latter is high by using Protocol 2 in comparison with the former due to both computation and communication
overheads. Just for this reason, we demand to minimize the number of AND gates as possible as we can.
Concretely, the procedures to design a comparison circuit and the pseudo-codes are explained as follows.
We denote two L-bits integers by x = (xL, xL−1, · · · , x1) and y = (yL, yL−1, · · · , y1). One 2-input AND gate and
three XOR gates can achieve a 1-bit comparator shown in Fig. 2, and then L sequential 1-bit comparator can compose
comparison circuit (CMP as illustrated in Fig. 3). Specifically,
- For c1 = 0, the comparison result ci+1 = [x > y];
- For c1 = 1, ci+1 = [x ≥ y].
Through comparing xi with yi from the low to the high, and then passing the result as an input to the next com-
parator, we achieve a private comparison of two L-bits positive integers x, y and obtain the result z.
z = [x > y] =
1, x > y0, x ≤ y
After detailed investigation and research, our design determines to apply the circuit proposed in Kolesnikov et al.
(2009) for integer comparison, which is optimized by “free-XOR” gates and exactly matches our design goals.
8
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Figure 2. 1-bit comparator (Kolesnikov et al., 2009) Figure 3. Comparison Circuit (CMP) (Kolesnikov et al., 2009)
Algorithm 3 Integer Comparison
Input: x, y
Output: Comparison result z
1: function CMP(x, y)
2: c1 ← 0
3: for i = 1 · · · L do
4: ci+1 ← xi ⊕ ((xi ⊕ ci) ∧ (yi ⊕ ci))
5: end for
6: return z = cL+1
7: end function
3.4. Private Sorting
As stated previously, in our main protocol we need to sort the encrypted buyers’ and sellers’ bid values in a certain
way. Similarly to the design of private integer comparison, we can just design a sorting Boolean circuit composed
of only XOR and AND gates. Based on the integer comparison circuit presented in Section 3.3, we can more easily
describe the sorting circuits used in our work.
Due to our private mechanism design from the circuit level, our main protocol can adopt various sorting circuits.
We compare the influence of different sorting circuits on our privacy-preserving auction mechanism. Specifically,
we have employed the selection sort (SeSort), the bitonic sorting network (BiSort) and the odd-even merge sorting
network (OESort) (?; Wang et al., 2010a; Ye et al., 2010). The comparison result displays the immense advantage
of the odd-even sorting network which is shown in Section 4 in some detail. The sorting algorithms are presented as
follows.
• SeSort. The selection sorting algorithm is noted for its simplicity which has O(n2), and it has performance
advantages over more complicated algorithms in certain situations, particularly where auxiliary memory is
limited.
• Sorting Network. A circuit that sorts an input sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn) into a monotonically increasing se-
quence (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n). The main component of sorting network is compare-and-swap circuits, a binary opera-
tor taking as input a pair (x1, x2), and returning the sorted pair (x′1, x
′
2), with x
′
1=min(x1, x2) and x
′
2=max(x1, x2).
Fig. 4 gives an illustration of a compare-and-swap circuit and a sorting network for n = 4.
(1) BiSort. Bitonic sort is one of the fastest sorting networks by taking the divide-and-conquer strategy. The
key building blocks of a bitonic sorting network are the bitonic merge networks which rearrange bitonic
sequences to be ordered. A bitonic sequence is a sequence with x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk ≥ · · · ≥ xn for some
k(1 ≤ k ≤ n), or a circular shift of such a sequence.
(2) OESort. The odd-even merge sorting algorithm is based on a merge algorithm that merges two sorted
halves of a sequence to a completely sorted sequence. As desirable properties, the odd-even merge sort-
ing network is data-independent and achieves a computation complexity of O(n log2 n). In practice, it
outperforms most widely used sorting network algorithms (Emmadi et al., 2015).
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(a) Compare-and-swap (b) Sorting Network
Figure 4. Sorting Network: n = 4
Algorithm 4 Select Sorting
Input: sequence a = {a0, · · · , an−1}
Output: the sorted sequence(non-decreasing)
1: function SeSort(a)
2: for i = 0 . . . n − 1 do
3: k ← i
4: for j = i + 1 . . . n − 1 do
5: if CMP(a j, ak) then
6: k ← j
7: end if
8: end for
9: if i , k then
10: temp← ai
11: ai ← ak
12: ak ← temp
13: end if
14: end for
15: end function
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Algorithm 5 Bitonic Sorting network
Input: sequence a = {a0, · · · , an−1}
Output: the sorted sequence(non-decreasing)
1: function BiSort(up, a)
2: if n ≤ 1 then
3: return a
4: else
5: m← n/2
6: f irst ← BiS ort(True, a[0 . . .m − 1])
7: second ← BiS ort(False, a[m . . . n − 1])
8: return BiMerge(up, f irst + second)
9: end if
10: end function
11: function BiMerge(up, a)
12: if n ≤ 1 then
13: return a
14: else
15: BiCMP(up, a)
16: m← n/2
17: f irst ← BiMerge(up, a[0 . . .m − 1])
18: second ← BiMerge(up, a[m . . . n − 1])
19: return f irst + second
20: end if
21: end function
22: function BiCMP(up, a)
23: m← n/2
24: for i = 0 . . .m − 1 do
25: if CMP(ai, ai+m) = true then
26: ai ⇐⇒ ai+m
27: end if
28: end for
29: end function
Algorithm 6 Odd-even Merge Sorting
Input: sequence a = {a0, · · · , an−1}(n a power of 2)
Output: the sorted sequence(non-decreasing)
1: function OESort(a)
2: if n > 1 then
3: apply OESort(n/2) recursively to the two halves a0, ..., an/2−1 and an/2, ..., an−1 of the sequence
4: OEMerge(n)
5: end if
6: end function
11
/ Computer Communications 00 (2019) 1–16 12
Algorithm 7 Odd-even Merge
Input: sequence a = {a0, · · · , an−1} of length n > 1 whose two halves a0, ..., an/2−1 and an/2, ..., an−1 are sorted (n a
power of 2)
Output: the sorted sequence
1: function OEMerge(n)
2: if n > 2 then
3: apply OEMerge(n/2) recursively to the even subsequence a0, a2, ..., an−2 and a1, a3, ..., an−1 of the sequence
4: for i = 1;i < n;i← i + 2 do
5: if CMP(ai, ai+1) = true then
6: ai ⇐⇒ ai+1
7: end if
8: end for
9: else
10: if CMP(a0, a1) = true then
11: a0 ⇐⇒ a1
12: end if
13: end if
14: end function
3.5. Example
Finally, we use a toy example to demonstrate our auction protocol.
Step1: Setup
Let us assume M = N = 5, the bid-ID pairs of sellers (V si , si) are (200,1), (500,2), (100,3), (450,4), (150,5), and
likewise the ones of buyers (Vbi , bi) are (220,1), (180,2), (400,3), (300,4), (550,5), respectively. The agent generates
its secret and public keys (sk, pk).
Step2: Bidding
Each buyer or seller encrypts its bid-ID pair in the EBV form using the public key of the agent, and submits
Epk(Vbi , bi) = {ELpk(Vbi ), EL
′
pk(bi)} or Epk(V si , si) = {ELpk(V si ), EL
′
pk(si)} to the auctioneer. For example, the buyer b1
submits Epk(200, 1) and the seller s1 submits Epk(220, 1) to the auctioneer.
Step3: Private sorting
The auctioneer inputs the sellers’ EBV bid-ID pairs and the buyers’ EBV bid-ID pairs into a private sorting
protocol, and gains a non-descending order of the former and a non-ascending order of the latter:
The sellers’ EBV bid-ID pairs:
Epk(100, 3) ≤ Epk(150, 5) ≤ Epk(200, 1) ≤ Epk(450, 4) ≤ Epk(500, 2)
The buyers’ EBV bid-ID pairs:
Epk(550, 5) ≥ Epk(400, 3) ≥ Epk(300, 4) ≥ Epk(220, 1) ≥ Epk(180, 2)
Step4: Private winner determination
The auctioneer with the assistance of the agent compares the above encrypted sellers’ bids ELpk(V
s
i ) with the
corresponding encrypted buyers’ bids ELpk(V
b
i ) in proper sequence until the index of the last profitable transaction k is
found. In light of Equation (1), we can find k = 3, that is tantamount to mean, the first two sellers and the first two
buyers are the winners.
k = argmax{ELpk(V sk ) ≤ ELpk(Vbk )}
Step5: Outcome release
Before sending the auction outcome in the EBV form for decryption, the auctioneer needs to randomly permute
the EBV IDs whose index is before 3, and then submits the resulted arrays to the agent.
After decryption, the agent is aware of that the group of sellers {s3, s5} and the group of buyers {b5, b3} are the
winners. And then he needs to sort the two groups in ascending order ({s3, s5}, {b3, b5}) and sends all decrypted data
back to the auctioneer. Finally, the auctioneer charges the price of 300 from each winning buyer and pays the price of
200 for each winning seller.
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3.6. Security Analysis
Now we prove theoretically that our mechanism (Protocol 1) preserves privacy in the sense of Definition 1. Note
that since all sellers and buyers take part in the auction by providing their encrypted bids and IDs, and receiving the
plain auction outcome, they do not actually participate in the essential computations. We therefore need to mainly
prove that the auction computations between the auctioneer and the agent preserve privacy. To prove this, we take
two steps. First, we show that our gate computations (like Protocol 2) are private. Second, we show that Protocol 1 is
private based on the privacy of the gate computations.
Theorem 1. Given two encrypted bits, we can privately compute the encrypted result of a XOR or AND gate in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. First, it is obvious that an XOR gate can be computed privately. Let the auctioneer holds the two encrypted
bits, then it can compute the encrypted result by immediately multiplying the two input ciphers. The process is private
since neither the auctioneer nor the agent knows anything about the two input bits, and both their views are some
ciphertexts generated with a semantically secure cryptosystem or a random key pair, which can be easily simulated.
Next, we show that Protocol 2 computes an AND gate privately. We show that both the auctioneer’s and the
agent’s views can be simulated. In Protocol 2, the view of the auctioneer is
{E(a), E(b), E(a2 ∧ b2), a1, b1}
Where the first three ciphers can be simulated with arbitrary three ciphers encrypted with the same public key due
to the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption, and the latter two bits are random bits and can be simulated
with two random bits drawn from the same distribution.
The view of the agent is {a2, b2}, which are also two random bits and can be simulated similarly.
We now can conclude that Protocol 2 computes an AND gate privately. Therefore, Theorem 1 is proved. 
Theorem 2. Protocol 1 is private in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need only to show that we can compute every step privately, and then sequentially
compose these steps getting a whole private protocol. Now we show the privacy of each step based on Theorem 1.
Step 1 is naturally private due to the normal cryptosystem’s setup.
Step 2 is private due to the semantic security of the used cryptosystem.
Step 3 can be implemented using a sorting circuit comprised of only XOR and AND gates, and the circuit can be
privately computed gate by gate. Therefore, based on Theorem 1 and the sequential composition theorem (Hazay and
Lindell, 2010), this step is also private.
Step 4 is private similarly to Step 3.
In Step 5, we carefully design the outcome release, such that only the auction outcome including the IDs of
winners and the clearing prices are revealed (Note that we use a random permutation for the auctioneer and the agent,
respectively, so that the bid ranking information of winners is leaked to none of them). Therefore, this step is private,
too.
With the sequential composition theorem (Hazay and Lindell, 2010), we can conclude that Protocol 1 is private.

4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we implement our proposed mechanism for double auctions using Java in Windows 10 with Intel’s
Core 4 Duo CPU 2.20 GHz. Furthermore, we analyze the influence of proposed protocol performance using different
sorting algorithms such as the selection sort (SeSoet), the bitonic sorting network (BiSort) and the odd-even merge
sorting network (OESort). We simulate the auctioneer and the agent with the two processes on a computer.
The experimental setting is as follows: the bit length of homomorphic encryption scheme bitlen (i.e. L in Defini-
tion 2) is 8 or 16 bits; the numbers (M,N)(assume M = N) of sellers and buyers are ranging from 8 to 256 which must
be a power of 2. All experimental results are averaged on 10 random repetitions. In our evaluation, we concentrate on
the performance metric of computation complexity which can be reflected in total CPU time spent by the auctioneer
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and the agent.
Figure 5 shows the curves of running times and message volumes of our proposed protocol as the numbers M(or
N) vary from 8 to 256, with bitlen=8 and bitlen=16, respectively. According to the figure, we can make the following
observations:
• Curve Trend: For all curves, the computation complexity of our protocol is increasing as the number of sellers
or buyers increases. Specially, with the growth of the number M(or N), the running time of the selection sort is
rising sharply; by comparison, two other curves are rising slowly.
• Performance Comparison: Given the number of sellers or buyers, the computation complexity of SeSort is
much larger than that of OESort and BiSort. Obviously, the difference becomes more significant as the number
of M(or N) increases. For example, when the number of sellers or buyers is 256 and bitlen=8, the running time
of SeSort is about 132 min and that of OESort is only about 15 min.
• Influence of bitlen: Employing the same sort algorithm, when the bitlen is twice as much, the running time
would increase obviously. In particular, as for the selection sort, the running time is also about double times
that of the original.
From the analytical and experimental results above, we can see that the efficiency of the odd-even merge sorting
network is significantly or slightly better than that of the selection sort or the bitonic sorting, which can achieve a
computation complexity of O(n log2 n) and be feasible for practical applications. Take into account this reason, we
are recommending the odd-even merge sorting network in the proposed protocol.
5. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing work on secure and privacy-preserving auctions and mechanism designs and
explore the unique features that we have proposed.
Double auctions have been studied extensively in recent years. For instance, Wang et al. proposed TODA (Wang
et al., 2010b), a truthful online double auction for allocation in wireless networks. Samimi et al. proposed CDARA
(Samimi et al., 2016) to come to an optimal market-based resource allocation in cloud computing environments.
Nassiri-Mofakham et al. presented a new packaging model MACBID (Nassiri-Mofakham et al., 2015) in order to
find the combination (and quantities) of the items and the total price which best satisfy the bidder’s need. Bing et
al. investigated bidding strategies for automated traders that select marketplaces and submit offers across multiple
double auction marketplaces (Shi et al., 2016). However, most of them considered only single-sided auctions, and the
existing double auction mechanisms do not provide too much privacy guarantee.
Extensive work has emphasized on privacy-preserving auction designs for conventional auctions, such as Li et al.
(2015), Peng et al. (2002), Suzuki and Yokoo (2003), and Yokoo and Suzuki (2004). However, most of these studies
(Peng et al., 2002; Suzuki and Yokoo, 2003; Yokoo and Suzuki, 2004) had the drawback of confidential information
disclosure in the sense of cryptography. The research Li et al. (2015) did preserve privacy in the sense of cryptography
like our work, but it paid more attention to double spectrum auctions making use of garbled circuits. Although utilizing
garbled circuits have some advantages in terms of computation overhead, our main design targets are to achieve an
alternative privacy-preserving double auction mechanism based on Goldwasser-Micali homomorphic encryption, and
to analyze the influence of the proposed protocol performance with regard to different sorting algorithms. Furthermore,
the protocols and algorithms proposed in our paper can also be used to combine with the garbled circuits to obtain a
better performance.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed an alternative privacy-preserving mechanism for double auctions. As far as we
know, the proposed mechanism is the first scheme for privacy-preserving double auctions based on Goldwasser-Micali
homomorphic encryption. Moreover, we have theoretically proved that the proposed mechanism preserves privacy in
the presence of semi-honest adversaries. Finally, we have investigated three sorting circuits for our mechanism, and
experimentally shown that different sorting algorithms may have great influence on the performance of the mechanism.
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We believe that our practical, easily implemented mechanism can be applied to other real-world applications for
privacy protection, such as trading markets, electronic transactions and public verification of private data.
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